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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
AND THE WALL CAME TUMBLING DOWN
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON*

The Supreme Court's first significant encounter with the First
Amendment establishment clause was not until the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education.' Justice Black, after tracing the history
of the clause, suggested that its purpose was to erect a wall of separa*Inaugural lecture by Rosalie Berger Levinson, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, delivered on March 25, 1984. B.A., 1969; M.A., 1970, Indiana University; J.D., 1973, Valparaiso University.
1. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Note that in Everson the establishment clause was
first held to be applicable to the states. Prior to this time the affairs of church establishment were left to the states. This "incorporation" has been challenged by later commentators and judges. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County,
554 F.Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), upholding prayer activities conducted by teachers
in public schools, later reversed on appeal, Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th
Cir. 1983). It has been suggested that the clause was designed primarily as a federalist
limitation, i.e., established churches existed in many states when the Bill of Rights
was adopted and the main purpose of the clause may have simply been to keep Congress out of the area. See Cord, The Court's Impact on Religious Freedom, in A CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL REFORM: THE PROCEEDINGS 100-101 (1982), arguing that Jefferson's
use of the "wall of separation" metaphor referred only to a limitation on Congressional authority. Note that Professor Cord as well as the three other panelists at the
Conference all argued that the establishment clause was not intended to apply to the
states. Id. at 101-114. Professor Cord has expanded on his thesis in his book entitled
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982). He also

suggests that neither Madison nor Jefferson were the strict absolutists that Black
portrayed them to be in Everson. See also Howe, Religion and the Free Society: The
Constitutional Question, in SELECTED ESSAYS 1938-62, 31 (1963). These authorities rely
heavily on the Blaine Amendment, proposed several years after the adoption of the
14th Amendment, which would have added a provision explicitly prohibiting states
from making laws respecting an establishment of religion. It is argued that the restriction would have been superfluous if the 14th Amendment already made the establishment clause binding on the states. However, as Justice Brennan explains, at the time
the Blaine Amendment was proposed, it also contained a prohibition against laws interfering with religion-at a time when the 14th Amendment had already been interpreted as protecting against state violation of the free exercise of religion. School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-55 (1963). Thus this history is
not conclusive. See also Curtis, Judge Hand's History 86 W. VA. L. REV. 109 (1983),
criticizing the Jaffree court's historical analysis as defective, for failing to consider
Republican legal, political and philosophical thought in the Civil War period, which
supports the incorporationist view.
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tion between Church and State, a wall "which must be kept high and
impregnable."' He borrowed the metaphor from Thomas Jefferson,
who had been instrumental in fighting the battle for religious freedom
in Virginia in 1785-six years before the constitutional amendment
was adopted Ironically, the Supreme Court decision, while citing the
metaphor, went on to uphold a New Jersey statute permitting taxraised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as part
of a general welfare program providing transportation for all students.'
Four dissenters argued forcefully that this use of tax dollars violated
the purpose of the clause, which was to create "a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support of religion."'
The uncertainty as to the meaning and purpose of the Amendment, reflected in this early decision, has never been resolved.
Although Everson continued to be a key decision in many "parochiaid"
cases, its "wall of separation" theme failed to provide clear solutions
to the difficult questions facing the Court. Despite the absolutist
language, between 1965 and 1970 federal assistance to religious schools
totaled $250 million.6 Chief Justice Burger in a 1971 decision suggested
that the line of separation "far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of
a particular relationship."7 The Supreme Court has developed a detailed test for analyzing establishment clause problems,' but the opinions reflect a gradual erosion of the enunciated standard-an ero2. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. He stated that the Establishment Clause precludes
laws which favor one religion as well as laws favoring all religions. Id. at 15.
3. Jefferson's January 1, 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association is
quoted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1861). Note the
Jeffersonian statement first appeared in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878). Although Jefferson's use of the metaphor reflected his fear that religion would
corrupt politics, it has been suggested that Roger Williams, who feared corruption
of religion from the taint of politics, first used the phrase. Gorman, Toward a More
Perfect Union, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, 41 (1963); Kurland, Of Church
and State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1961). See also P. MILLER,
ROGER WILLIAMS (1953).
4. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. The Court relied on a child benefit theory first
set out in Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930).
5. Id. at 31-32. Note also the language used by Justice Frankfurter in
McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948): "Separation means separation,
not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between church
and state speaks of a 'Wall of Separation,' not of a fine line easily overstepped."
6. M. SMITH AND J. BRYSON, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: THE LEGALITY OF USING
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS, 70 (1972).

7.
8.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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sion which is probably inevitable in light of the inconsistencies and
the internal confusion in its "test."
The Supreme Court's most recent decisions appear to mark the
deepest erosion of the wall of separation. In 1983 the Court upheld
both tuition tax credits for parochial education, 9 and the practice of
having prayers and paying a chaplain's salary in a state legislature.10
This year it upheld a city's practice of using tax dollars to display
a nativity scene during the Christmas season." Outside the judicial
arena there have also been numerous attempts to further erode the
wall. Congressional bills to remove the prayer issue from the federal
courts and to permit periods of silence or voluntary prayer in public
schools are being pushed with increased vigor."l The Reagan administration's proposal of a constitutional amendment to permit prayer
in public schools was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 56-44 in
March, 1984.13 It is also seeking to aid parochial education through
9. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
10. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). This decision is discussed in
infra, notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
12. Senator Jeremiah Denton of Alabama is sponsoring a bill that would deny
federal aid to school districts that did not allow students at any grade level to use
classrooms for religious meetings. S. 1059, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (presently on
the Senate Calendar, but with no date set for action). Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon
has introduced a similar bill that would extend such privileges only to students in
grades 7-12. S. 815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
13. The proposed prayer amendment provides: "Nothing in this Constitution
shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or other
public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or by any state
to participate in prayer." S.J. Res. 73, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). President Reagan
stated, "The amendment we'll propose will restore the right to pray ....
Changing
the Constitution is a mammoth task. It should never be easy. But in this case I believe
we can restore a freedom that our Constitution was always meant to protect." N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1982, at B. 10, col. 1. The Senate Judiciary Committee added an amendment, suggested by Senator Thurmond that: "Neither the United States nor any state
shall compose the words of any prayer to be said in public schools." This obviously
does not cure the essential evil of official government sponsorship of prayers chosen
by government officials. It was this proposal that lost in the Senate by at 56-44 vote
on March 21, 1984. See 33 CONG. REC. 2901. An alternative amendment, sponsored by
Senator Hatch, is limited to permitting silent prayer or meditation in public schools
as well as allowing student religious groups equal access to public school facilities.
S.J. Res. 212, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984). Note that the Supreme Court has never
held that public schools may not set aside a moment of silence, nor that they cannot
allow student religious groups to use the facilities (see infra notes 109-110), thus rendering such an amendment unnecessary, while at the same time creating a likelihood of
divisiveness across the nation. Note, however, that the Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in the case of Wallace v. Jaffree, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), challenging
Alabama's statute authorizing "voluntary prayer" in public schools, consisting of one
minute of nonactivity for meditation or silent prayer. 52 U.S.L.W. 3713 (April 3, 1984).
Efforts to overrule the prayer and bible decisions began in 1963, shortly after
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the provision of tax incentives. 4 Further, a presidential proclamation
was issued making 1983 "the Year of the Bible."' 5 And 1984 began
with Reagan's formal recognition of the Vatican-a step that other
Presidents have refused to take for 165 years.16
This lecture will examine the development of the wall, as well
as its gradual erosion in recent years. Should the wall be
reconstructed -how much entanglement between church and state
does the Constitution tolerate? The apparent inconsistencies and the
unworkability of the present test suggests the need for new standards.
A.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL

The First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.... ."" The provision thus contains both non-establishment and
free-exercise requirements -requirements which at times appear to
be in conflict. While some have suggested that the paramount aim
of the Religion Clauses was to avoid an establishment of religion,
others have argued that the free exercise phrase was intended to be
the dominant one. is The history behind the provision fails to provide

the Schempp decision. About 150 separate measures by 111 Congressmen to amend
the Constitution so as to permit prayer recitation, Bible reading, or both, in the public
schools were introduced into Congress. The history of some of these early measures
is traced in L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 213-218 (1975). It is interesting that despite the opinion polls indicating that some 80% of Americans favor
prayer in the schools, a constitutional amendment has never been adopted. Pfeffer
explains that this may be due in part to opposition expressed by religious leaders.
He also notes, however, that the trend appears to be moving in favor of a constitutional amendment. For example, the Catholic Church which originally took an antischool prayer position until 1948, then a pro-prayer position from 1948 to 1963, appeared to accept the Supreme Court's decision in Schempp until 1973. Since that time,
however, the Catholic Church has adopted a pro-prayer position. Id. at 355.
14. S. 550, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See Tuition Tax Relief Act of 1981:
Hearings on S. 550, Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, at 22-23 (1981).
15. Proclamation No. 5018, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 181 (Feb. 3, 1983).
16. President Reagan nominated William A. Wilson to be ambassador to the
Vatican on January 10, 1984. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 22, (Jan. 16, 1984). Somewhat
ironically, at the same time the Italian government and the Vatican signed a concordat officially ending the status of Roman Catholicism as the established state religion
of Italy. Kamm, Italy Abolishes State Religion in Vatican Pact, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19,
1984, section 1, p. 1, col. 5.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Note that the words were proposed by James Madison
in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, 5 (1982).
18. D. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, 3 (1963).
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any clear cut answers. The framers were obviously cognizant of the
religious wars, especially the Thirty Years' War in the Seventeenth
Century, which had decimated Europe from the Reformation on,
culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the dominance of the
established Church of England, and the ill treatment of dissenting
Protestants and Catholics. 9 Justice Black, in invoking the wall of
separation metaphor, noted that a large proportion of the earlier settlers of this country came from Europe to escape the bondage of laws
that compelled them to support government-favored churches. Yet
ironically the same practices of the Old World were transplanted to
and began to thrive in the colonies where, based on grants from the
English Crown, individuals and companies began to erect religious
establishments which all residents were required to support and
attend.'
The most immediate precursor of the First Amendment was the
struggle in Virginia where Thomas Jefferson and James Madison lead
the battle in 1785 to reject the renewal of a Virginia tax levy for
support of the established church. 2 Seventeen years after this struggle Jefferson uttered his famous words on the separation of church
and state.' The constitutional amendment, ratified in 1791, lay dormant,
however, for the first one hundred and fifty-eight years of constitutional history, until the Everson decision in 1947. Then after a period
of some respite, the 60's brought a sudden great agitation and litigation over church-state relations. The upsurge coincided with the
general assertion of civil rights during this period as well as the
emergence of voluntary organizations, such as the American Jewish
Congress, Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference,
whose purpose was to champion religious freedom. 3
19. See, e.g., Berman, Religious Foundationsof Law in the West: An Historical
Perspective, f JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION 3, 24-28 (1983).
20.

Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-13; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1962). See

also COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA,- Chs. 3-6 (1902); L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM, 71-90 (rev. ed. 1967).
21. The Virginia Assessment Bill, a taxing measure for the support of religion,
was designed to revive the payment of tithes, a practice which had been suspended
since 1777. See Everson,.330 U.S. at,.
36 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
22. See supra nate 2.
%

23.

LA NOUE, A REVIEW. OF CHURCHISTATE LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS

1961-62, 17

(background reports, National Conference of Christians and Jews, Sept. 1962).
Although there was very little litigation during the first 185 years in this country, this does not mea6 that the separation of church and state did not exist. By the
mid 18 31's ten states had voluntarily abandoned their establishments of religion. During the 19th Century only one state.,. Massachusetts, passeda law requiring a reading
of the Bible in public schools. Most of the Bible reading laws challenged in the 1960's
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The outcome of this increased litigation was the Supreme Court's
expansion of its separationist theory. In a series of cases in the early
60's rejecting school prayer, the Court stated that to withstand the
strictures of the establishment clause a government practice had to
have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advanced nor inhibited religion.24 Later decisions added a third
requirement-that the law not create excessive entanglement between
government and religion.25 The importance of this third prong has remained less than clear. It was first suggested in a decision upholding
tax-exempt status for church property." It was then used in Lemon
v. Kurtzman to strike down various forms of state aid to sectarian
education, which the Court believed would require intolerable government surveillance to assure its dollars were not spent on the religious
goals of the schools.27 In the same decision, Justice Burger expanded
on this notion of entanglement to include a concern for the divisive
political potential of such programs28 -a concern reflected in some of
the subsequent parochiaid cases.29 Later in a 1973 decision, the Court
struck several state efforts to aid parochial education below the college level, this time relying primarily on the "effects" prong."
Even as the Court began to solidify a test, it was clear that there
was much disagreement on the bench as to which parts were most
were products of the 20th Century. See JOHNSON AND YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, 33 (1948).
24. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
25. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Generally the courts have found
entanglement implicated when the practice at issue brings government officials into
close, ongoing contact with the affairs of religious institutions, thereby endangering
the independence and integrity of both church and state.
26. Id. at 670, 674-76.
27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
28. Id. at 622-24.
29. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Note, however, that the
Court has not yet relied on the potential for political divisiveness as the sole basis
for invalidating a statute under the establishment clause. The Court expressly refuses
to do so in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1356 (1984). Citing Mueller v. Allen,
103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071, n.11 (1983), the Lynch decision notes that political divisiveness
should be explored only in cases which involve a direct subsidy to religious institutions. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1356. A vigorous dissent rejected this limited use of political
divisiveness as contrary to precedent, i.e., the concept first appeared in the context
of tax exemptions which were viewed as an "indirect" benefit to religion. Id. at 1374-75,
n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Note, The Forbidden Fruit of Church-State Contacts:
The Role of Entanglement Theory in its Ripening, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 725, 741 (1982).
See also, Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1980) (payment of federal CETA
funds to religious elementary and secondary schools invalidated based solely on political
divisiveness).
30. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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relevant and how they should be applied. Indicative of the division
on the Court is the Meek v. Pittinger decision of 1975. 31 In that case
a Pennsylvania statute was challenged which provided auxiliary services and the loan of instructional materials to parochial schools, as
well as text book loans to all children enrolled in non-public elementary and secondary schools. The Court held that aside from the text
book loan provision, which paralleled a program upheld in an earlier
Supreme Court case,32 the act violated the establishment clause. The
Court reasoned that the effect of the aid was directly and substantially to advance religious activity because of the predominantly
religious character of the schools.3 The Court set out a four-part test,
focusing upon secular legislative purpose, primary effect, the avoidance
of excessive entanglement, and political divisiveness. It held that the
auxiliary services would require excessive entanglement and would
create the danger of creating a politically divisive atmosphere." It
stated that a program would not be invalidated simply because aid
makes it more likely for some children to attend sectarian schools.
However, the instructional materials constituted aid which although
ostensibly secular, resulted in direct and substantial advancement of
5
religion.1
Significantly the Court split three-three-three in the decision.
Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall would have invalidated all
three types of programs. They argued that the more recent decisions
had overruled the earlier case upholding text book loans, because of
the divisive political potential of yearly appropriation debates as well
as the excessive entanglement as to the choice of text books." Justices
Burger, Rehnquist and White felt that all three programs should be
approved. The plurality, they said, had ignored the record which
demonstrated non-entanglement; simply the potential of entanglement
is an insufficient basis to invalidate this type of government
assistance. Finally Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell, voted to
uphold only the text book loan program. They found that the instructional materials and equipment constituted direct aid to the school,
i.e., they had the primary effect of advancing religion ($12,000,000 was
31.

421 U.S. 349 (1975).

32. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
33. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. at 363.
34. Id. at 372.
35. Id. at 366.
36. Id. at 378-79.
37. Id. at 385. Note that Justices Rehnquist and White totally denounced the
entanglement prong in the earlier decision of Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 768-770 (White, Rehnquist, concurring) (1976).
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massive aid);3" and the auxiliary services were struck mainly because
of the entanglement problem.39 Another part of the act would have
permitted the state to provide therapeutic services to students attending parochial schools. A majority held the services could not be
rendered on school property because the pressure of the parochial
environment on the therapist might cause him to aid in the religious
mission. 0 A dissenter responded, "The notion that by setting foot inside a sectarian school a professional therapist or counselor will succumb to sectarianization of his or her professional work is not supported by any evidence."41 The Court's desire to maintain its separationist posture appeared to approach the ludicrous. The textbook loan
program, the only surviving form of assistance, was upheld on the
basis of an earlier Supreme Court decision; stare decisis, rather than
any true analysis, was the basis for validating this part of the act.42
Thus, although the Supreme Court has appeared to apply a clear
standard looking to purpose, primary effect, entanglement, and political
divisiveness, it is deeply divided as to how the factors should be applied. The distinctions between objectionable and non-objectionable
forms of assistance are clearly unsatisfactory. Diagnostic services on
school premises are permitted; therapeutic services are not. 3 Math
textbooks may be loaned to children in parochial schools; math flash
cards or other types of auxiliary services are forbidden." As one commentator observed, the opinions read "like a complicated settlement
hammered out at the bargaining table after the give-and-take of
negotiation, rather than the product of rational and consistent adjudica-

38. Meek, 421 U.S. at 363, 365-66.
39. Id. at 367-370.
40. Id. at 369.
41. Id. at 392. (Rehnquist, quoting district court).
42. Id. at 359-362. Note that in the subsequent decision of Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977) the Court again upheld a textbook loan program. It admitted in
a footnote the discrepancy between Allen and subsequent cases, but concluded that
it would not overrule the decision but would simply fail to extend it beyond the textbook loan situation. Id. at 251 n.18. In the same decision the Court upheld the provision of therapeutic services to students off school property, thereby eliminating the
constitutional defect in Meek where the services were offered on school grounds. Id.
at 247.
43. Meek, at 371 n.21. Note the concurring 6pinion of Justice Burger suggesting
that withholding these important benefits penalizes children because of their parent's
choice of religious exercise. Id. at 386. The state clearly has a secular purpose in
assisting physically and psychologically handicapped children to reach their maximum
potential, The fact that some of these children find themselves in parochial schools
should be irrelevant.
44. Id. at 367-373.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/1

Levinson: Separation of Church and State: And the Wall Came Tumbling Down
CHURCH AND STATE

1984]

tions ... on the issue of constitutionality."45 However, certain trends
are apparent. Although until 1970 most forms of aid were approved,
the Walz decision and its introduction of an "entanglment" standard,
led to disapproval of almost all forms of assistance, thus basically maintaining the wall of separation."
The same separationist approach is reflected outside the context
of aid to parochial education. In the 1982 decision of Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 7 the Court struck a state statute that gave schools
and churches the power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses for
establishments within a 500-foot radius of their premises. While conceding that the statute had a secular purpose, (protecting churches
and schools from the commotion associated with liquor outlets), the
Court struck the statute on the second prong, i.e., the law gave the
churches standardless political power, thus having a primary effect
of advancing religion." The Court conceded that the city could have
passed a direct prohibition in the form of a zoning ordinance which
would have been permissilbe. 9 The constitutional defect, however,

45.

D. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 7-8 (1963).

46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977). This line of cases, however, should be contrasted to the Court's
approach regarding financial aid to higher institutions, i.e., Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding federal construction grants, provided no part of the project
is used for sectarian instruction or religious worship); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding Maryland's annual grants to sectarian institutions); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding South Carolina construction grants to colleges and universities). At least one authority has challenged the logic of this distinction: ". .. it is highly questionable to conclude that the risk of sectarian instruction
creeping into a parochial school's physical education course is greater than the risk
of a similar entry into a college history course." Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The
Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147, 175.
Thus despite the Court's reliance on a four prong test, arguably it is really
applying a sliding scale approach balancing several factors, i.e., the nature of the benefit
or program-is it secular and can the secular be separated from the sectarian? Will
the separation require extensive government entanglement? Is the benefit so large
as to impermissibly advance religion? Second, looking to the nature of the beneficiary
or the character of the institution, the Court has noted the pervasive religiosity at
the elementary and secondary school level as contrasted to the environment at a university level. Third, the Court looks at whether the aid goes to parents or directly to
the institution; if to the latter, does it free up large amounts of money which can
now be spent to promote religion? Fourth, does the aid go to all children or just children
attending parochial schools, i.e., how broad is the class of beneficiaries?
47. 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
48. Id. at 511.
49. But see, Krebs, The Establishment Clause and Liquor Sales, 59 WASH. L.
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was in vesting veto power in a church entity, thereby giving the appearance "of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and
State" and enmeshing churches in the exercise of substantial government power contrary to the entanglement prong.50 Further the provision created the danger of political fragmentation and divisiveness
along religious lines.5 '
Significantly the Court's 1982 decision relied upon Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of a "Wall" between religious and government as
a "useful signpost."" It discussed the "symbolic benefit" to religion
which would occur from the exercise of such a veto power and it
remarked that "the framers did not set up a system of government
in which important, discretionary governmental powers would be
delegated to or shared with religious institutions."' In short, the Court
exhibited a pronounced preoccupation with the possibility of religious
strife where the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Man find
themselves at close quarters. The strong language in Larkin suggests
a trend towards even greater disassociation of church and state,
perhaps even challenging such church/state cooperative ventures as
government-aided religious hospitals and military chaplains. Commentators interpreted Larkin to mean that the wall would be breached
whenever government vested discretionary power in religious bodies.'
Thus, despite the growth of the Moral Majority, the Reagan administration proposals, and the Congressional prayer bills, it appeared
that the judiciary at least was going to maintain the wall of separation. Indeed the signals from the Larkin case indicated a rigid separationist approach to the church/state question.
B.

THE SUPREME COURT IN

1983-1984:

THE WALL BEGINS TO

CRUMBLE

Despite the verbiage in Larkin focusing on the wall of separation, three recent major decisions, decided within less than a year,
indicate that the wall is not as sturdy as the commentators believed.
Further, the decisions reflect the continuing deterioration and the un-

REV. 87 (1983), suggesting that zoning laws would likewise fail the Court's test of not
aiding and protecting religious institutions.
50. Larkin, 103 S. Ct. at 511.
51. Id. at 512.
52. Id. at 510.
53. Id. at 512.
54. See, e.g., Comment, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 10 OHIO N.U.L. REV.
349-359 (1983). Note even before Larkin the trend reflected a growing secularization
of law and religion. See, e.g., H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974).
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workability of the established test. The two 1983 decisions were so
significant as to have led Supreme Court watcher Jessie Choper to
call it "The Year of Religion and the Constitution."5 5 Although the
1982-83 term began with the Larkin decision, the two subsequent cases
reflect a sharp departure from the analysis in that case-a departure
which continues in the Court's 1984 decision.
In Mueller v. Allen 6 the Supreme Court again struggled with
the question of aid to parochial education. As explained earlier, the
trend had been to invalidate almost all forms of such assistance." In
one of the leading decisions, Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist,58 the Supreme Court in 1973 invalidated a New York Financial Aid program which included a tuition reimbursement plan for low
income parents as well as a tax relief system permitting deduction
from gross income for middle income parents for each child attending
school. The sections were found to have the "impermissible effect of
advancing religion." The Minnesota statute challenged in Mueller was
quite similar to the New York provision in that it allowed state taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in providing tuition, text books
and transportation for their children attending elementary and secondary schools. In the earlier Nyquist opinion, Justice Powell wrote that
the assistance was impermissible. 9 This time, in Mueller, he became
part of a five-Justice majority to uphold the scheme.
The Court had little difficulty finding valid secular purposes for
the tax relief provision, i.e., it assisted parents in meeting the rising
cost of educational expenses, it assured the continued vitality of
private schools which relieved the public school system of a tremendous financial burden, and it provided a wholesome competition with
public schools."
Much less persuasive was the Court's analysis of the "effects"
prong. It reasoned that the deduction was a "true tax deduction"
55.

5 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (1982-1983).

56. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
57. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
58. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
59. Id. at 794. Powell distinguished the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), upholding an exemption from state taxes
for property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes. Unlike
the tax scheme upheld in Walz, the Court reasoned that here the class of beneficiaries
was narrow-predominately schools associated with religion. Further there was a long
unbroken tradition of exempting church property from taxation and there was the
problem of excessive government entanglement if churches were to be taxed. Neither
of these concerns was present in the aid to religious schools debate. Id. at 792-794.
60. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3066.
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unlike the provision in Nyquist where the system consisted of outright
grants to low income parents and where the deduction for middle income parents was unrelated to the amount of money actually expended
by any parent on tuition." This distinction does not appear to be very
relevant. Whether the tax adjustment takes the form of a credit,
modification, or deduction appears to be much less significant than
the impact of the measure; and here the substantial state-granted
benefit to parents who send their children to sectarian schools is clear.
Further, the Court stressed that the deduction was available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children
attend nonsectarian private or public schools. The provision of benefits
"to a broad spectrum of groups" was found to mitigate the impermissible effect.6 ' Again Nyquist was distinguished as a case where
tuition grants were provided only to parents of children in nonpublic
schools. However, as a practical matter 95% of the deductions taken
under the Minnesota statute were by parents of parochial school
children. 3 Thus the primary effect was as much to aid religion as it
was in Nyquist.
The Mueller decision is significant for several reasons. It shows
the Court's manipulation of its standard, thus again illustrating the
weakness in the three-prong analysis. In addition, as the dissent points
out, the assistance here was not restricted to the secular function
of the schools, in contrast to the earlier decisions of Everson and Allen
where only textbooks and buses were provided. 4 It represents the
first time that the Supreme Court has upheld financial support for
religious institutions without any reason to assume that the support
would be restricted to the secular function of the schools and would
not be used to support religious instruction. It may be that the majority properly recognized the important contribution made by private
educational institutions and the double expense borne by parents who
choose parochial education, thus justifying its equalization of any
benefit that can be derived from the statutory classification. The difficulty is that the Court's analysis is weak, failing to provide any
analytically sound way of examining the question of aid to parochial
education.

61. Id. at 3068.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3065.
64. Id. at 3072. Note that in Everson the assistance was limited to bus fare,
whereas in Mueller the statute was specifically limited to books which the state had
approved for use in public schools.
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In a second significant case, Marsh v. Chambers,65 the Court
totally abandoned its earlier analysis and adopted an historical approach in order to uphold a practice that could clearly not meet the
traditional analysis. The Nebraska legislature began each day of its
session with a prayer by a chaplain appointed and paid by the state
legislature. In fact, the state elected the same individual, a
Presbyterian minister, since 1965 and paid him $319.75 for each month
the legislature was in session.6 The Supreme Co-.rt in a 6-3 decision
upheld the practice as being one deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of the nation. It relied heavily on the fact that a statute
providing for the payment of chaplains was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1789, just a few weeks prior to passage of the Bill of Rights.
According to the majority, this unique history indicates that the
framers did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers
to be a violation of that amendment.17 Further, the Court stressed
the two-century practice as indicating that legislative prayer presents
no potential for establishment. The Court found it irrelevant that
one chaplain had been selected for sixteen years and had given prayers
all in the Judeo-Christian tradition, commenting that the long tenure
of the chaplain was due to his performance and the acceptance of the
body appointing him, and the content of the prayers was irrelevant
where there was no indication that the prayer opportunity had been
exploited to advance any one faith or belief. 9
The majority made no pretense of applying traditional establishment clause standards, for clearly those standards could not be met.
The purpose of legislative prayer is preeminently religious rather than
secular; the primary effect is clearly religious; and extensive entanglement is problematic where the state is required to monitor and oversee
religious affairs to insure that the chaplain limits himself to suitable
prayers. As Brennan points out in dissent, the mere appearance of
a joint exercise of legislative authority by church and state provides
a significant symbolic benefit to religion."0 Further, the problem of
65. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
66. Id. at 3332.
67. Id. at 3334.
68. Id. at 3334 n.10.
69. Id. at 3336. Note Justice Stevens in dissent keys in on this designation
of a member of one religious faith for 16 years as constituting a preference of one
faith over another. Id. at 3351-52.
70. Id. at 3339. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recall the Supreme Court's emphasis
on symbolic benefits to religion in the earlier Larkin decision, discussed supra notes
47-54 and accompanying text.
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divisive political potential had become a reality, the issue having split
the Nebraska Legislature on religious grounds. 7' In short, the analysis
clearly departs from the Court's earlier opinions, which stressed the
7
separation and neutrality principles of the establishment clause. 1
Even the Court's reliance on legislative history is misplaced.
Brennan points out that Madison, who was one of those voting for
the bill authorizing the payment of the first Congressional chaplain,
7
later expressed the view that the practice was unconstitutional.
Although sometimes both he and Thomas Jefferson strayed from a
strict separationist approach, 74 both recognized the need to protect

71. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3339.
72. Justice Brennan summarized the serious problems with legislative prayer
as follows:
It intrudes on the right to conscience by forcing some legislators either
to participate in a 'prayer opportunity,' with which they are in basic
disagreement, or to make their disagreement a matter of public comment
by declining to participate. It forces all residents of the state to support
a religious exercise that may be contrary to their own beliefs. It requires
the state to commit itself on fundamental theological issues. It has the
potential for degrading religion by allowing a religious call to worship
to be intermeshed with a secular call to order. And it injects religion
into the political sphere by creating the potential that each and every
selection of a chaplain, or consideration of a particular prayer, or even
reconsideration of a practice itself, will provoke a political battle along
religious lines and ultimately alienate some religiously identified groups
of citizens.
Id. at 3344.
73. Id. at 3344. Others have similarly contested the constitutionality of
legislative prayer. See A. STOKES AND L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 479-81 (1950).
74. See Cord, The Court's Impact On Religious Freedom, supra note 1, at 102.
The author notes that Jefferson secured passage of a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians pledging the U.S. Government to give $300 to assist them in erecting a Roman
Catholic church, and for several years, $100 towards the support of a priest. He also
approved land grants to an evangelical order to propagate "the gospel among the
heathens." Id. Cord elaborates on this theme in his book SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1982), 36-46. He also notes that James Madison in 1785 sponsored a bill in the
Virginia Assembly punishing "Sabbath Breakers," as well as a Bill for Public Fasting
and Thanksgiving. Id. at 217-220. He concludes that the Supreme Court's separationist
thesis miscontrues history. The historical data is at best inconclusive. As Justice Brennan
noted in a lengthy footnote in his opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
Madison in a later essay argued against tax exemptions for churches, the chaplaincy
practice in Congress as well as in the army and navy, and presidential proclamations
of days of Thanksgiving. Id. at 684-85, n.5. Jefferson also refused on Establishment
Clause grounds to declare national holidays of thanksgiving or fasting, viewing such
as "religious exercises." 11 JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS 428-30 (1905). See also L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM, 266 (1967).
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against the religious strife which the prayer issue is generating today.
Brennan stressed that Marsh is a narrow opinion with little impact,
but there are obviously other traditional practices that might be subject to the same form of analysis, such as government sponsored
Christmas displays.
The decision raises the general question as to whether history
and tradition are a sufficient basis for upholding practices which are
of dubious constitutionality. Even if history and tradition could be
clearly ascertained and reduced to single precepts, the obvious difficulty with an historical approach is that it would condone such
onerous practices as race segregation, a tradition once firmly
embedded in this country which the Supreme Court has recently denounced even in the face of a free exercise claim." Moreover, as the
Court has acknowledged, "No one acquires a vested or protected right
in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of
time covers our entire national existence ..
.""7More specifically as
to the religion question, a rigid historical approach fails to recognize
that our nation is far more religiously heterogeneous today than it
was at the time the Founding Fathers sought to protect religious liberty. Thus, as Justice Brennan noted in the school prayer case, "practices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons,
the deeply devout and the non-believers alike."77 Although perhaps
Marsh cannot generally be read as favoring an historical approach,
it does indicate the Supreme Court's willingness to abandon its own
doctrine.
In the Supreme Court's most recent encounter with the establish8
ment clause, Lynch v. Donnelly,"
the Court upheld a display by
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, of an admittedly religiously significant symbol, a creche, as part of an officially sponsored holiday display. 9 The
five-man majority basically followed the Lemon analysis, but, as Bren75. In Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), the
Supreme Court upheld the IRS interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code to preclude
tax-exempt status to institutions practicing race discrimination. It held that whatever
burden denial of tax benefits places on the exercise of religious beliefs was substantially outweighed by the government's compelling interest in halting racial segregation in education.
76. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
77. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
78. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
79. The nativity scene cost the city $1365.00 when it was originally purchased.
The city spends about $20.00 per year erecting and dismantling it. Id. at 1358.
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nan points out in dissent, its "less than vigorous application of the
Lemon test suggests that its commitment to those standards may only
be superficial."' Indeed, the majority states that it has never felt itself
to be confined to any single test.8 The tenor of the decision is reflected
in Justice Burger's introductory remarks. He notes that the wall of
separation metaphor is "not a wholly accurate description" of churchstate relations in this country." He states that the Constitution mandates accommodation83 and he gives an exhaustive list of church-state
interactions which have been tolerated in the past. 4
Despite these remarks, the Court proceeds nevertheless to follow
the traditional Lemon analysis, finding first that the purpose of displaying a nativity scene is simply to celebrate a national holiday and to
depict the origins of that holiday.8 5 The most significant point made
in the Court's rather fatuous discussion of purpose is its assertion
that a law should be invalidated on this ground only where there is
no question that the activity is motivated "wholly by religious considerations," thus requiring plaintiffs to meet an extremely difficult
standard.86 The majority rejects Justice Brennan's persuasive argument that the existence of non-sectarian means to accomplish secular
goals impugns the city's assertion of a non-religious purpose. The inclusion of a creche which has such a distinctively religious nature tends
to demonstrate that sectarian purposes really motivated the city's decision. If any doubt remained, such should have been dispelled by the
city's response to the law suit-a major crusade led by the mayor
of Pawtucket himself to "keep Christ in Christmas." This suggests
that what the city has done is to accept and implement the view of
its predominantly Christian citizens that the religiously significant
creche should be kept in the Christmas display.
As to the effects standard, the Court simplistically concludes that
any benefit to religion is indirect, remote and incidental-in short,
no more an advancement of religion than the exhibition of religious
paintings in governmentally supported museums. The fact that the
city owns the creche and that it expends time, energy, and dollars

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1370-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1358-59.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id. at 1360-61.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
See District Court's findings, 525 F. Supp., at 1173.
104 S. Ct. at 1364.
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displaying it, indicates that the city has placed its imprimatur of approval on a particular religious belief. The same significant symbolic
benefit to religion that the Court so recently decried in the 1982
Larkin decision has been approved here.89
Finally, the Court found no violation of the entanglement prong
in that the display did not require day to day on-going interaction
between church and state. Further, it was found that the only political
divisiveness came as a result of the commencement of the law suit.
There was no evidence of political friction or divisiveness over the
creche in the forty year history of Pawtucket's Christmas celebration. What the majority has failed to acknowledge is that its decision
will likely result in competing efforts by other groups to gain and
maintain their own religious symbols. Further, as Brennan notes in
dissent, the quiescence of opponents to the creche may have reflected
nothing more than their sense of futility in opposing the majority.
Thus divisiveness may have existed during earlier years and clearly
the controversy over whether local government can adopt religious
symbols will continue to fester."
The Court states that the symbol poses no real danger to the
establishment of religion because it is merely a "passive symbol," and
that striking its use would be a "stilted overreaction."'" This is offensive to those for whom the creche has profound significance as a
recreation of the birth of their Messiah, an event which lies at the
heart of the Christian faith. It is equally offensive to those who do
not view the story of Christ as an unavoidable element of our national
heritage. Inclusion of a creche in a Christmas display is clearly not
necessary to accommodate individual religious expression;92 nor is it
in any way necessary to serve secular goals. As Brennan cogently
notes in dissent, "... . to say that government may recognize the holiday's traditional, secular element of gift giving, public festivities and
community spirit, does not mean that government may indiscriminately
embrace the distinctively sectarian aspects of the holiday."93 Brennan
views the city's action as a. "coercive ...step towards establishing

89. See supra, notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
90. 104 S. Ct. at 1373-75 (Brennan-, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1365.
92. Note that after the lower court's ruling, a private citizen group, formed
by the Mayor, purchased the creche from the city and refurbished it, planning to display
it on private property in future years. The fact that a private citizen group can so
easily continue the practice of displaying its desired religious symbol indicates the
lack of any strong justification for government to do so.
93. Id. at 1378.
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the sectarian preferences of the majority at the expense of the minority .... ," Thus although the Court's decision to uphold this practice
may not seem terribly critical in comparison to the school prayer or
parochiaid cases, it is a significant indication of the Court's willingness
to distort its own doctrine and to erode the wall of separation. Thus
it too suggests the need for a new analysis.
C. SHOULD THE WALL BE RECONSTRUCTED: How MUCH
ENTANGLEMENT DOES THE CONSTITUTION TOLERATE?

As the previous discussion indicates, it has become very clear
that establishment clause doctrine must be reconsidered. The old test
is logically unsound, unworkable and in fact sometimes ignored by
the Court itself when it desires." Problems abound both in terms of
logic and policy. As to secular purpose, the Court appears at times
to be ignoring reality when it "discovers" some type of a secular purpose to justify an enactment.' Lower courts have done likewise. For
example, it has been held that a nine-foot concrete cross or a crucifix
serves as a war memorial and thus has a secular purpose.97 The
94. Id. at 1386.
95. Several Justices as well as other authorities have suggested alternative
approaches. For example, it has been proposed that the two clauses in the first amendment really serve a single value, i.e., the protection of the individual's freedom of
religious beliefs and practices. Thus in any case implicating religion, the free exercise
value should predominate. See A. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR
STATE, 113-16 (1951) (establishment clause does not protect freedom in same sense as do
other Bill of Rights guarantees); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, S 14-17 (1978)
(free exercise principle should prevail in conflict with anti-establishment principle to
tolerate religion as broadly as possible); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and DoctrinalDevelopment: Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1381, 1389 (1967) (free exercise clause outweighs establishment clause in cases of conflict). Such an approach, however, would appear to unduly benefit religion contrary
to at least one of the purposes of the clauses. Others have suggested that the two
clauses be read as making the Constitution "religion blind", i.e., that the clauses connote a "single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action
or inaction because these clauses . . . prohibit classification in terms of religion either
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." See Kurland, Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961). For a critical response see Pfeffer,
Religion Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. REV. 389 (1963). More recently Jessie Choper
has suggested that a statute should be found violative of the establishment clause
only if its purpose is to aid religion and its effect endangers religious liberty by coercing, compromising or influencing religious beliefs. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 675 (1980).
96. As Professor Tribe has noted, "the court will usually find in the statutory
language or elsewhere a secular purpose for the challenged law [- any purpose that
is arguably non-religious-] ....
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 836 (1978).
97. In Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 518, 463 P.2d 360 (1969), cert. denied,
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Supreme Court's recent findings that the display of a nativity scene
serves the secular purpose of celebrating the origin of "a national
holiday" is equally disingenuous, especially in light of the Mayor's
crusade to "keep Christ in Christmas.""8 The inquiry into motive is
often a speculative and fruitless venture. Further the requirement
may create a tension with the free exercise clause which at times
requires the government to carve out special exceptions in order to
accommodate a person's religion. 9
The effects prong also has proved to be problematic. Many laws
have numerous effects, both secular and sectarian, and the Court has
never clarified how much of a sectarian effect invalidates a provision."
397 U.S. 1042 (1970), the lower court had ordered a city to take down a 51 foot concrete cross erected in a public park by a private party. It found the primary purpose
was to permit the majority to display its preferred religious symbol. In the interim
city voters approved a charter amendment accepting the cross as a gift to the city
for use as a war memorial. This time the Court upheld the challenged cross. Eugene
Sand & Gravel v. City of Eugene, Or. -, 558 P.2d 338 (1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 876 (1977). Note similarly Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1978),
upholding an L.A. resolution authorizing the lighting of windows in the city building
on Christmas and Easter (at a cost of $103 each illumination) as serving the secular
purpose of symbolizing peace and fellowship; Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041
(1968), holding that a cross composed of lights displayed on the side of the courthouse
during the Christmas season was a yule decoration designed to attract holiday shoppers rather than a religious symbol. Note that the Fox decision was subsequently reversed by the California Supreme Court, relying on the California constitution which
the court stated was more comprehensive than the U.S. Constitution. Fox v. City of
Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663 (1978). See Comment, Municipal Display
of Religious Symbol Enjoined in California,31 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1979-80); Comment,
Fox v. City of Los Angeles: Preference of Religion and the Use of Independent State Constitutional Grounds, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 666 (1980). On the other hand, contrast the more
recent decision of American Civ. Lib. Union of Ga. v. Rabun County, 678 F.2d 1379
(11th Cir. 1982), affid on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983), holding that the erection
of a cross at a state park violated the establishment clause. There the cross was
dedicated on Easter Sunday, and a Chamber press release stated that it was "a symbol of Christianity for millions of people in this great nation"-making any assertion
of any secular interest virtually impossible. Id. at 1381-82.
98. See supra, note 87, and accompanying text.
99. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held
that an exception to the state's compulsory education laws had to be carved out for
members of the Amish Church who declined to send their children to public school
after completing the eighth grade. The Court addressed the Establishment Clause problem, specifically finding that it must give way where the exemption is vital to the
protection of free exercise rights. Id. at 214. The same is expressed in the concurring
opinion of Justice White. Id. at 240-41.
100. See L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 287 (1975); Note, The
Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education, 91 YALE
L.J. 1196 (1982) (distinguishing various types of secondary religious effects, and pro-
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In every school aid case it is apparent that any functional assistance
to parochial education frees other dollars for use in support of the
school's religious mission. Further, any assistance to parents such as
tax credits, results in increased enrollment in parochial schools, thus
advancing religion. And yet such practices have been upheld by the
Court."'
As to excessive entanglement, if the establishment clause mandates separation of church and state, government is required to see
that dollars are not spent to promote religious interests. Yet the type
of surveillance that the establishment clause appears to require, is
just the type that is now forbidden under the excessive entanglement
prong." 2 The confusion the test has generated is not surprising.
In seeking a new approach it is useful to note that establishment clause cases can generally be divided into two categories: those
cases where government is rendering aid to a religious entity while
furthering secular goals and those where government appears to be
interjecting religion into the government realm or is otherwise promoting religion. These two types of cases generate different concerns
and thus should trigger different analyses.
1. Where Government Provides FinancialAssistance to Religious
Entities The Purpose Must be Secular and the Assistance must be
Uniformly Provided.
Where government is rendering aid to a religious entity, it can
be argued that if government has an identifiable secular purpose for
a practice which merely has an incidental benefit on religion, a lesser
scrutiny is triggered. An analogy can be drawn to cases dealing with
free speech where the Court has frequently noted that when government seeks to promote interests unrelated to the suppression of
speech, a lesser standard is appropriate. Thus in the case of United

posing a balancing of secular purpose and secondary effect on religion to determine
constitutionality).
101. See supra, notes 56-64, and accompanying text.
102. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 668 (1971) (White, J., concurring). Note
too that in light of the recent decision in Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) upholding a legislative scheme which reimbursed
private schools for the cost of administering state mandated tests, but which required
them to keep accurate accounting records, it has been questioned as to whether the
entanglement prong is still viable. See, e.g., Note, Direct Public Aid to Secular Educational Function of ParochialSchools, 48 TENN. L. REV. 127, 140 (1980); Comment, Cessation of Excessive Entanglement Test and the Establishment of Religion, 7 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 975 (1980).
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States v. O'Brien"3 the Court held that when "speech" and "non-speech"
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element
can justify incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms.0 4
Government is justified in prohibiting draft card burning even where
this action is taken as a form of protest, because the government's
interest in mandating possession and retention of draft cards has
nothing to do with the suppression of ideas. Similarly it can be argued
in the religion area that where government can sustain its burden
of proving secular purpose for its enactment, the aid should be upheld,
provided it does not in any way coerce belief nor favor certain beliefs
over others."'
Applying this analysis to earlier Supreme Court decisions, it
would appear that the Court correctly upheld the payment of transportation costs to students attending religious schools. The government
could show a substantial interest unrelated to the provision of aid
to the religious mission, namely the protection and safe transportation of children to school. The same is true of the provision of
diagnostic or therapeutic services. The state has an important secular
interest in assisting physically or psychologically handicapped children,
whether they are in parochial or public schools. Further, the assistance
cannot be viewed as causing coercion of belief nor favoring certain
beliefs over others, provided the reimbursement scheme applies to
children attending schools of all religious faiths.
The more recent aid
tion tax credits may also
persuasively documented
and secondary level may

to parochial education cases involving tuibe able to meet this standard. It has been
that private education on the elementary
be keeping public education alive in some

103. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
104. Id. at 376.
105. The significance of secular purpose was clearly explained by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:
. . . the establishment clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate
legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area
of human conduct: Man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some
transcendental idea and man's expression of action of that belief or
disbelief. ...
With regulations which have other objectives the establishment clause,
and the fundamental separationist concept which it expresses are not concerned ... [0]nce it is determined that a challenged statute is supportable
as implementing other substantial interests than the promotion of belief,
the guarantee prohibiting religious "establishment" is satisfied.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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parts of the country. As one New York lawmaker noted, "many of
our great cities would be financially crippled if the private school
systems had to close their doors . . . and hundreds of thousands of
1
additional pupils appeared on the doorstep of the public schools.""
'
Statistics estimate that 10% of the students in elementary and secondary schools nationwide are educated in non-public schools and that
the majority are enrolled in church related schools. For example, 90%
of the non-public school students in New York attend parochial
schools. °7 Government at least in certain areas has a clearly secular
purpose then in keeping these institutions alive. Provided it documents
the financial advantage of aiding private educational institutions, and
in disperses the aid uniformly, in no way seeking to coerce belief,
the assistance should be upheld."'
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted this
"free speech" analogy, this type of analysis is reflected in the recent
decision of Widmar v. Vincent."9 There the University of Missouri
altered its previous practice of allowing all registered student groups,
including religiously oriented groups, to use the facilities on campus.
When sued for its discriminatory policy, the University's defense was
that permitting religious groups to use the facilities would violate the
establishment clause.1"' The Court rejected this defense, finding that
the purpose of a neutral access policy is to provide a forum wherein
students can exchange ideas and the primary effect is not religious,

106.

Schools, 47
107.

Comment, P.E.A.R.L. v. Regan: Permitting Direct State Aid to Parochial
BROOKLYN L. REV. 469, 471 n.5 (1981).

Id. See also

NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS

1988-89, 19 (1978).
108. Note that the extent of the assistance becomes relevant only in ascertaining whether the government's purpose is truly secular. In this sense the standard
proposed differs from the Lemon analysis of primary effect. If the same secular ends
could equally be attained by means which do not have consequences for promotion
of religion, the assistance cannot stand. Otherwise the aid should be upheld without
engaging in a rather disingenuous, misleading inquiry into "primary effect." See supra
note 100, and accompanying text.
The fact that a majority of nonpublic schools are affiliated with the Catholic
Church (nationwide more than 80% of the students in non-public schools are enrolled
in Catholic schools; see, supra, note 107) should not be problematic unless there was
some showing that the purpose of aiding non-public schools was to support the Catholic
mission.
109. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
110. Id. at 272. Note that allowing such groups to privately use university
facilities differs from government interjecting religion into the public realm -a practice which this article suggests triggers a stricter analysis. See infra, notes 124-146
and accompanying text.
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TO
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i.e., any religious benefits are incidental. In a sense the Court found
a substantial interest on the part of the University that was totally
unrelated to the provision of aid to religious groups and that the practice in no way favored certain beliefs over others.
Such a practice can be contrasted to the situation involving a
high school which decides to permit communal prayer meetings on
school premises before the commencement of classes. The narrow
religious focus of such a decision would make it much more difficult
for the government to argue that its intent is not related to the advancement of religion. 1 ' Although, as discussed previously," 2 the question of motive or purpose is often a difficult one, much of the confusion would be eliminated by a standard requiring the government to
carry the initial burden of showing some substantial interest which
has nothing to do with religion. Once the government has done this,
the burden would shift to the plaintiffs to rebut the asserted secular
government interest as chimerical or unsupported by legislative
history.
As noted earlier, another challenge available to plaintiffs would
be that the assistance, while serving secular interests, intentionally
*favors certain religious beliefs over others or somehow coerces belief.
The Supreme Court recognized the need for a different approach to
such discriminatory measures in the recent decision of Larson v.
Valente."3 In that case Minnesota's Charitable Contribution Act provided that only religious organizations which received more than half
of their total contribution from members or affiliated organizations
would be exempt from the registration and reporting requirements
of the Act. The apparent purpose of the Minnesota law was to
withdraw tax benefits from certain religious groups, such as the
"Moonies," who derive much of their funds from public solicitation.
The Supreme Court struck the statute, but it did not apply the threepart test of Lemon v. Kurtzman. Instead it held that any statute which

111. Contrast the recent decisions in Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971
(2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981), and Lubbock Civil Liberties Union
v. Lubbock Independent School Dist. 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 800 (1983). Others have noted the distinction between elementary and secondary school, where attendance is compulsory and children are much more impressionable.
Further, the residential nature of colleges creates a much greater need for accommodations of on-campus religious opportunities. See Howarth & Connell Students' Rights
to Organize and Meet for Religious Purposes in the University Context, 16 VAL. U.L.
REV. 103, 127-128 (1981).
112. See supra, notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
113. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 1
730

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

grants a "denominational preference" must be subjected to strict
scrutiny by the courts, i.e., the government has to show a compelling
interest and no less drastic means when it promotes one religion over
another."' Justice Brennan stressed that the 50% rule set up a type
of official denominational preference that the framers of the first
amendment clearly forbade."' Since historically one of the key purposes of the first amendment was to ban government favoritism of
an established church,"' Brennan's logic in applying a strict scrutiny
standard should be accepted.
The possible ramifications of such an analysis are significant. The
Supreme Court in an earlier decision upheld Sunday closing laws as
against an establishment clause challenge." 7 It found that although
the original purpose of such laws may have been sectarian, the laws
today could be viewed as simply promoting the secular purpose of
having a uniform day of rest."' Using the Larson approach, however,
it is arguable that even if there is a secular purpose to the law, its
preference for Christians over non-Christians would trigger strict
review, i.e., a requirement that government show a compelling interest
and no less drastic means. It is debatable as to how compelling a
uniform day of rest really is and certainly, although a uniform day
of rest requires choice of one day, there is no rational explanation
for the choice of Sunday," 9 which has an adverse effect on Sabbatarians
and others.
114. Id. at 246-47.
115. Id. at 242-45.
116. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. Note especially Professor
Cord's book SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, in which he suggests, relying heavily
on Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," that the only purpose of the establishment clause was to protect against "the dangers of giving any religion a preferred
status through the use of public funds and power." See CORD, supra note 1, at 20-21.
117. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
118. Id. at 444-45.
119. Note that the Supreme Court in a companion case to McGowan upheld
Pennsylvania's Sunday closing laws as against a free exercise challenge by an Orthodox Jew arguing that his ability to earn a livelihood would be impaired by the
law. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The Court reasoned that it was not
necessary to apply strict scrutiny analysis because the legislation imposed only an
indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., it simply made the practice of religion
more expensive, but it did not outlaw the religious practice itself. The court's
characterization of the burden as being merely indirect has been criticized and it has
been suggested that the analysis in the case fails to survive subsequent Supreme Court
decisions which have been more protective of religious liberty. Compare Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding that the state had no compelling interest to justify
the denial of unemployment compensation to a Sabbatarian who refused to accept Saturday labor) and Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a Jehovah's
Witness who quit his job based on his religious conviction could not be denied unemployment compensation benefits).
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A religious preference argument was also raised in the Donnelly
case. 2 ' In addition to their assertion that display of a city-owned
nativity scene fails to meet the traditional three prong analysis, plaintiffs also contended that a strict scrutiny test had to be used because
the creche favors Christianity over non-Christianity. 2 ' Thus, even if
the display of the nativity scene could somehow survive the tradi'
tional test, 22
the action would still be unconstitutional if it impermissibly discriminates among religious groups. The Court summarily
rejected the Larson argument with virtually no explanation. 23' Under
the analysis suggested here, however, the case fits more appropriately into the category of religious intrusion into the realm of
government.
2. Where Government Permits Religion to Intrude into the Public
Realm or it Otherwise Acts for a Religious Purpose, it Must Meet
Strict Scrutiny Analysis
When government decides to introduce prayer into its schools
and legislatures, to hire chaplains for its servicemen, or to place
religious symbols on its stamps, money, or property, its intent can
only be viewed as a desire to interject religion into the public realm.
Contrary to the Lemon analysis, however, the finding of a religious
purpose should not necessarily spell defeat of a provision. Instead of
seeking to manufacture some strained secular justification for an enactment, courts should more honestly face the difficult question of how
far government can accommodate religious freedom without violating
the wall of separation. Where government acts for the benevolent purpose of preserving or protecting religious freedom, there is a direct
confrontation between the two religion clauses and a court must
balance the need to reconcile the separation of church and state with
the need to protect religious freedom. In such situations, Justice
Douglas has suggested the importance of an "accommodating neutrality," that the state cooperate with religious authorities in order to

120. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). For the decisions below see Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981), affd 691 F.2d 1029 (lst Cir. 1982).
The District Court applied the three prong Lemon analysis, finding that the city's
action in maintaining a nativity scene violated each aspect of the test. The Court of
Appeals, relying on the intervening Larson v. Valente decision, see supra, notes 113-15
and accompanying text, applied a strict scrutiny test and found that the city's action
violated the establishment clause because it had no compelling government interest
in erecting a nativity scene. 691 F.2d at 1035. Alternatively it affirmed the conclusions of the District Court on the tripartite establishment clause test set forth in Lemon.
121. See Brief of the Respondents, at 38-47.
122. But see supra, notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
123. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 n.13.
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accommodate spiritual needs."2 Justice Douglas stressed that the Constitution does not require government to show a callous indifference
to religious groups.125 The difficult question though is when does too
much accommodation lead to an establishment of religion?
It is clear that when the government purpose is admittedly
religious, there is a much more direct confrontation with the wall of
separation. The analysis is thus parallel to that in the free speech
cases where the government purpose or aim is to halt a particular
expression - a situation which triggers strict scrutiny." Similarly here,
where the government's purpose is a religious one, the standard must
be more stringent. Historical arguments, such as those advanced by
the Court to validate the practice of legislative chaplains, provide insufficient protection in light of today's pluralistic society. The need
for separation of church and state is accentuated by the present composition of our American society, and it demands'a greater sensitivity than perhaps even the framers had in mind.' Thus only if government can satisfy the heightened standard of compelling interest and
necessary means should it be able to interject religion into the government sphere.
Although the standard is a difficult one, applying it to various
situations indicates that it is not an impossible one. It is clear that
in cases such as Marsh, the government probably would not be able
to sustain its burden. It is very difficult to find a compelling justification for mandating religious prayer in the legislature and paying a
chaplain to lead the group in worship. It is significant that in the
Marsh opinion the Supreme Court made no attempt to come up with
any justification, but rather relied solely on its historical argument.'28

124. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952). Justice Douglas stated, "[w]e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id. at 313.
125. Id. at 314. Note that the accommodating neutrality theory suggested in
this decision was not adhered to in subsequent cases. The Supreme Court in Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), returned to a more absolutist view, rejecting the unstructured accommodation principle. The concept was used, however, in pre-1962 lower court
decisions. See, e.g., Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 181 N.Y. 230 (1958 (upholding
the display of a nativity scene on public school grounds as constituting merely a "passive
accommodation" of religion).
126. Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972): "The First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
127. There are almost 90 different religious bodies in this country reporting
a membership of over 50,000. See, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
1982-1983 54-55 (103rd ed., 1982).
128. See supra note 65-72 and accompanying text.
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The fact that the Nebraska legislature had employed a Presbyterian
minister for 16 years and had permitted only Judeo-Christian prayers
further accentuates the impermissibility of such a practice, because
it appears to favor certain religions over others. On the other hand,
the practice of providing chaplains in the military suggests a closer
case. Here again the government purpose is a benevolent one, protection of religious freedom. However, unlike legislative prayer, the
government may be able to sustain its burden of showing a compelling need for accommodating the free exercise rights of men in the
military, many of whom are not there voluntarily. Assuming the practice seeks to satisfy the religious needs of all denominations, it should
be upheld against establishment clause challenges. 9
A striking example of government's attempt to protect religious
freedom is found in the provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which bars religious discrimination in employment. 3 ' The
Supreme Court has never directly confronted the constitutional question of whether the enactment violates the establishment clause; it
has ruled, however, that the Act does no more than require an
employer to take steps to reasonably accommodate the religious needs
of its employees. Thus it held in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison'3' that an employer is not required to bear more than a de
minimus cost in order to comply with the law. At least two lower
courts have found that Title VII's religious accommodation obligation
violates the establishment clause.'32 The majority of federal courts,
129. The Supreme Court in the school prayer cases suggested the constitutionality of this practice. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 226, n.10 (1963). In addition to the arguable free exercise problem, it has also
been urged that government-paid military chaplains may be deemed "necessary for
the defense of the nation," thus overriding the establishment clause. L. PFEFFER, GOD,
CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION, 160-161 (1975). See also Figinski, Military Chaplains-A
Constitutionally Permissible Accommodation Between Church and State, 24 MD. L. REV.
377, 409 (1964); Hermann, Some Considerationson the Constitutionality of the United
States Military Chaplancy, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 24, 34 (1964). The author notes that the
establishment clause-free exercise problem would be better solved by permitting
government employment of chaplains only where military or navy personnel are
demonstrably unable to attend civilian churches or avail themselves of religious counseling. Note that an accommodation approach has been used to uphold the maintenance
of a chapel in a penal institution. See People ex rel New York League for Separation
of Church and State v. Lyons, 173 Misc. 821, 21 N.Y.2d 250 (1940).
130. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's
. . . religion."
131. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
132. Anderson v. General Dynamic Convair Aerospace Division, 489 F. Supp.
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however, have upheld its constitutionality, reasoning that the purpose
of the anti-discrimination provision is to achieve equality of employment opportunity; that the primary effect does not advance religion;
and that it does not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 33' Utilizing the test suggested here, it can be argued
that the government purpose is to preserve and protect religious
freedom in this country. The government's interest is a compelling
one that cannot be served by any less drastic means, i.e., it can only
protect religious freedom by prohibiting discrimination on religious
grounds and requiring at least minimal accommodation on the
employer's part. The statute thus is not an unconstitutional violation
of the establishment clause.
Another example is government's provision of tax-exempt status
to religious bodies.'" Even if government is acting for religiously
motivated reasons, the practice is justifiable in light of the basic
premise that the power to tax is the power to destroy.'" Thus, government has a compelling interest in accommodating the free exercise
rights of all religious denominations, many of which would be unable
to function if taxation were permitted. '
As for the controversial school prayer issue, religious instruction and worship in the classroom cannot realistically be viewed as
782 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D.
Cal. 1977), aff d on other grounds, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
928 (1980).
133. See, e.g., Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 587 (1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir. 1981); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd
432 U.S. 63 (1977); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affd
by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Burns v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.,
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,184 at 11,977-78 (D. Ariz. 1979), on remand from 589 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1978); Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C.
1975). See also Eades, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-An Unconstitutional
Attempt to Establish Religion, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of an Employer's Duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs and Practices, 56 CHi.KENT L. REV. 635 (1980) (finding that S 701(j) fails the secular effects test); Retter, The
Rise and Fall of Title VII's Requirement of Reasonable Accommodation for Religious
Employees, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 63, 84, n.127 (1979) (discussing several cases
on the constitutional issue).
134. This practice was upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
135. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819).
136. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled that taxation of church property would violate the free exercise clause, it has struck down municipal ordinances
which required religious groups (Jehovah's Witnesses) to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities of spreading religious doctrine by distributing
religious pamphlets. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett
v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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serving any substantial government interest unrelated to the advancement of religion. Rather it should be conceded that government is
seeking to accommodate the free exercise rights of its citizens.
However, the opportunity for prayer and worship is clearly available
off school premises. More significantly, even during school hours
nothing in the present Constitution forbids individual prayer."' It is
only where government seeks to institutionalize prayer, composing
prayers, dictating that teachers lead students in worship, or mandating
a set time each day for prayer that the courts have stepped in to
protect both religious freedom as well as freedom from religion.
Government simply has no compelling reason for interjecting prayer
into the classroom, where it risks offending the sensibilities of children
compelled to attend school and their parents."' This conclusion does
not, as some have argued, reflect a hostility to religion. Rather it rests
upon the well established premise that both religion and government
can work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere.'39
Applying this analysis to the question of a government supported
nativity scene it is difficult to see how the state's erection and
maintenance of religious symbols can ever pass constitutional muster. "'

137. Two recent political cartoons reflect the confusion on this point. One is
a Peanuts cartoon portraying Sally mournfully gazing down at her difficult exam thinking, "I wish they hadn't outlawed school prayer." The other depicts two children leaving school as a stern teacher looks on. The one exclaims, "Boy did I get into trouble
in school today. I fell asleep and the teacher thought I was praying." The cartoons,
though humorous, depict the basic misconception in this area.
138. Note that Justice Brennan argued in the school prayer cases that even
if government could come up with some type of secular motive, i.e., the creation of
a certain moral tone or atmosphere in the classroom, the provision would still have
to be struck in that government could accomplish its purpose through non-sectarian
means. Thus Brennan was borrowing the less drastic means requirement used in the
strict scrutiny approach.
139. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The same concept is
well expressed in the school prayer case, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), where
the Court noted that a union of government- and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion, and that the establishment clause was based in part on an
awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious
persecutions go hand in hand. Id. at 431.
In the subsequent case of School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) the Court noted that although the free exercise clause prohibits the
denial of free exercise of religion to any one, it does not mean that the majority can
use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs. Id. at 226.
140. Note though the case of State ex rel, Singelmann v. Morrisson, 57 So.
2d 238 (La. App. 1952), rehearing denied, 57 So. 2d 238 (La. 1952), upholding the erection of a statute of a Catholic nun in a public park which commemorated the nun's
charitable work in New Orleans. The decision was cited with approval by Justice Bren-
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Obviously the more religious the symbol, the more difficult it is to
assert secular purpose.' To argue that a creche is not a religious
symbol indicates an insensitivity to Christianity as well as to our
pluralistic society. It is difficult to perceive that display and
maintenance of a creche serves any government interest unrelated
to the endorsement and advancement of religion. Indeed at oral argument the attorney for the plaintiff emphasized the factual findings
of the district court that the Pawtucket creche had no economic,
cultural or traditional purpose."' The question then becomes whether,
conceding a religious accommodation intent, government has a compelling interest in sponsoring the creche. The answer is apparent. Just
as the Supreme Court held in Stone v. Graham... that schools in Kentucky could not be required to display tablets recording the Ten Commandments, similarly it violates the establishment clause when government sponsors a creche which appears to invoke state imprimatur for
the symbol. As one lower court commented, the display of a religious
symbol "... permits an inference of official endorsement of the general
religious beliefs which underlie that symbol . . . persons who do not
share those beliefs may feel that their own beliefs are stigmatized
or officially deemed less worthy than those awarded the appearance
of the city's endorsement.' '44

nan. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298 n.74 (1963).
Such monuments can be viewed as tributes to the individuals rather than to the religions
for which they labored and are, therefore, constitutionally permissible.
141. See Note, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 1216, 1229. The author lists two factors to
be considered in determining whether display of a religious symbol violates the establishment clause-the extent to which the article is religious and its permanence. Id. at
1234. The ease with which these factors can be manipulated indicates their unworkability. For example, in the earlier Lowe decision, see supra note 97, the court reasoned
that a concrete cross was not permanent. Since the permit to build was revocable,
the cross could be quickly removed and its existence was contingent on the will of
the city council. Lowe, 451 P.2d at 123.
Note that some courts have looked to the expenditure of public funds on the
erection, maintenance or display of religious symbols as being a critical factor. The
fact that no public funds were expended was deemed critical in Fenske v. Coddington,
57 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1952); Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833, cert. denied 207 So.
2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 1041 (1967); and Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc.
2d 1015, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1958).
142. D. Stewart, Taking Christ out of Christmas, 69 ABA JOURNAL 1832, 1837
(Dec. 1983).
143. 449 U.S. 39 (1980). Note that in this case the Supreme Court was unmoved
by the attempted secularization of a religious text and stated that "[tihe Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no
legislative recitation of a proposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Id. at 41.
144. Lowe v. City of Eugene, 463 P.2d 360, 36 A.L.R.3d 1249, 1253, (1969).
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Although government should and constitutionally must protect
the individual's right to religious freedom, it simply has no business
placing its power and prestige behind the symbols of any religious
group. 45
CONCLUSION

Although over the years the Court has fairly consistently sought
to maintain the wall of separation between church and state, recent
decisions indicate a disturbing trend toward erosion of the barrier.
The decisions come at a time when the Moral Majority as well as
the administration in power and certain vocal Congressmen clamor
for prayer in the schools, censorship of instructional material on "moral
grounds" and generally religious solutions to difficult problems such
as the abortion issue. This erosion also comes at a time when our
society is growing more and more pluralistic, as new groups adhering to different religious tenets continue to enter our country. This
article suggests a compromise of the competing concerns. Government
should be permitted to support religious entities which aid in its
accomplishment of various secular goals, serving the educational as
well as the medical, psychological and charitable needs of its citizens.
Provided the government assistance is nondiscriminatory and noncoercive, an incidental benefit to religion should not be held to violate
the establishment clause.
However, when government seeks to interject religion into the
public realm, or to otherwise act for religious purposes, much more
serious concerns are triggered. Although strict scrutiny analysis has
been reserved for the most fundamental of our liberties, i.e., only
where important first amendment rights or other critical interests
are implicated, underlying most establishment clause cases is the

145. As expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .. "
It has been argued that government display of religious symbols is at best a
"minor encroachment" on the First Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, earlier
rejected precisely that argument in the School Prayer cases noting that "the breach
of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent, and in the words of Madison 'it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
of our liberties."' School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963). Madison commented that the same authority which can establish Christianity,
in exclusion of all other religions, can also establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of other sects. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, in 2 WRITINGS OF MADISON, 183, 185-86 (G. Hunt ed., 1980).
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strong potential for coercion and interference with free exercise rights
as well as more generally interference with freedom of belief. It is
clear, for example, that when the state legislature, school or court
of law places its imprimatur on a particular theological belief, it
necessarily offends the sensibilities of both nonbelievers as well as
devout believers who regard prayer as a private experience. 4 ' It interferes with what Justice Brennan refers to as a right to conscience
by "forcing individuals either to participate in a prayer opportunity
with which they are in basic disagreement, or to make their disagreement a matter of public comment by declining to participate.' '47 The
fact that only a minority are so offended is immaterial, because the
whole purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect certain basic freedoms
from the will of the majority."8 In order for religious freedom and
majority rule to coexist, the majority must recognize that, no matter
how pure its intentions, it has no right under our system of government to exert its political power to gain a preferred place for its
religious beliefs. Justice Brennan stressed the importance of the
establishment clause as "a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause,
of religious liberty."'4 Viewed in this light, only a strict scrutiny ap146. The coerciveness of so-called "optional prayer" is reflected in the testimony
of Edward Schempp, the father of children who attended a school which sponsored
prayer and Bible reading. Although such was presumably optional, the father testified
that he chose not to have his children excused from attendance, fearing that the children
would be "labelled as odd balls" or would be lumped together as atheists or atheistic
communists. Further if the children were excused from Bible readings they would
be required to stand in the hall outside their "homeroom", carrying the imputation
of punishment for bad conduct. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 208-09, n.3 (1963) (quoting from trial court decision, 201 F. Supp. 815,
818 (E.D.Pa. 1962). See also Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court,
61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1065-66 (1963) ("[Ilmmature and impressionable children are susceptible to a pressure to conform and to participate in the expression of religious beliefs
that carry the sanction and compulsion of the state's authority"). But compare Griswold,
Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167, 177 (1963) rejecting the compulsion argument and
supporting the practice as teaching religious tolerance.
147. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3344. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. This understanding of the Bill of Rights was cogently explained by Justice
Jackson in West Virginia State. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943):
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
149.

School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/1

Levinson: Separation of Church and State: And the Wall Came Tumbling Down
1984]

CHURCH AND STATE

739

proach recognizes and exhibits the required sensitivity to the religious
needs of the pluralistic society in which we live.
(concurring opinion). See also Justice Rutledge's comments in Everson that " '[e]stablishment' and 'free' exercise [are] correlative and co-extensive ideas, representing only
different faces of the single great and fundamental freedom." Everson, 330 U.S. at
40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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